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I. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 1968, jurisdiction of Massachusetts courts over nonresi­
dents was minimal, I resulting in a limited forum to which residents 
could bring their grievances against nonresidents. In 1968, the Mas­
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Member of the New York and Massachusetts Bar Associations; B.S., Ithaca College, 
1966; Certificate of Completion, Institute D'Etudes Europeennes, Universite de Brux­
elles, 1968; J.D., University of New York at Buffalo, 1969. 
•• Senior Staff, Western New Eng/and Law Review; A.B., Haverford College, 1967; 
M.A., Chapman College, 1972. 
I. A patchwork statutory scheme established this limited jurisdiction. MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 90 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1967) (jurisdiction over nonresident motorists who 
cause injury while operating motor vehicles on the state's highways); id. ch. 223, §§ 37-38 
(1955) (jurisdiction over nonresident corporations doing or soliciting business in the 
state); id. ch. 227, § 5 (1955) (jurisdiction over a nonresident who, without a usual place 
of business within the state, engages in the construction or repair of buildings in the 
state). Zabin, The Long Arm Statute: International Shoe Comes to Massachusetts, 54 
MASS. L.Q. 101, 101-02 (1969). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, further­
more, was reluctant to give a broad construction to the jurisdictional statutes. See 
Wyshak v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 328 Mass. 219, 223, 103 N.E.2d 230, 232 
(1952) (mere solicitation of business insufficient to establish jurisdiction over foreign cor­
porations); Guida v. Second Nat'l Bank, 323 Mass. 100, 104, 80 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1948) 
(personal liability of a nonresident defendant cannot be established unless either per­
sonal service is made upon him within the Commonwealth or he voluntarily enters a 
personal appearance); Rosenthal v. Maletz, 322 Mass. 586, 590, 78 N.E.2d 652, 655 
(1948) (court has no jurisdiction to proceed in personam against promissory note payees 
and endorsers who are not residents of Commonwealth). 
353 
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sachusetts legislature enacted chapter 223A of the Massachusetts 
General Laws (Long Arm Statute).2 The United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts construed the purpose of the 
Long Arm Statute as the provision of a forum in which citizens of 
the Commonwealth can pursue causes of action arising from a non­
resident's activities within the Commonwealth.3 This article will de­
scribe the present state of the Long Arm Statute's interpretative case 
law in a business litigation context. 
Although the Long Arm Statute theoretically expanded the lim­
ited forum noted above, the first several cases to reach the Massa­
chusetts appeals courts deal not with the Act's substantive provisions 
but rather with the issue ofretroactivity.4 In 1972, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court decided "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. of 
America Y. Seneca Foods COrp.5 "Automatic" Sprinkler, a contract 
action for the unpaid balance due on a paUetizing machine sold to a 
nonresident, provided the basis for the substantive application of the 
Long Arm Statute. The court noted that the Long Arm Statute per­
mits assertion of state court jurisdiction over a nonresident within 
the limits established by the United States Constitution.6 After some 
major United States Supreme Court refinements to the constitutional 
dimensions oflong armjurisdiction,7 the Massachusetts Supreme Ju­
dicial Court, in Good Hope Industries, Inc. Y. Ryder Scott Co. ,8 enun­
ciated a two-step approach for the analysis of jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant. First, the activities of the defendant must in­
voke jurisdiction under the language of the Long Arm Statute. Sec­
ond, the assertion of long arm jurisdiction over the defendant must 
be consistent with the basic due process requirements of the United 
States Constitution.9 
2. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974). 
3. Mark v. Obear & Sons, 313 F. Supp. 373, 376 (D. Mass. 1970); deLeo v. Childs, 
304 F. Supp. 593, 595 (D. Mass. 1969). 
4. The courts validated retroactive application of the Act on the basis of the Act's 
remedial nature. Diamond Crystal Salt Co. v. P.l. Ritter Co., 419 F.2d 147, 148 (1st Cir. 
1969); Kagan v. United Vacuum Appliance Corp., 357 Mass. 680, 684, 260 N.E.2d 208, 
210-11 (1970). 
5. 361 Mass. 441, 280 N.E.2d 423 (1972). 
6. Id. at 443, 280 N.E.2d at 424. The court reiterated this principle in Ross v. Ross, 
371 Mass. 439, 441, 358 N.E.2d 437, 438 (1976). 
7. See notes 59-75 infra and accompanying text. 
8. 378 Mass. 1, 389 N.E.2d 76 (1979). 
9. Id. at 5-6, 389 N.E.2d at 79. The court reiterated this two step approach in 
Carlson Corp. v. University of Vermont, [1980] Mass. Adv. Sh. 659, 662, 402 N.E.2d 483, 
485. See also Campbell v. Frontier Fishing & Hunting, Ltd., [1980] Mass. App. Ct. Adv. 
Sh. 1145, 1147, 405 N.E.2d 989, 990. 
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Before proceeding to a description of the Long Arm Statute's 
interpretative case law, some background discussion is necessary. 
This background discussion, because of the two-step analytical ap­
proach promulgated by the supreme judicial court in Good Hope In­
dustries, focuses on the development ofjurisdictional concepts under 
the United States Constitution. The discussion will trace the consti­
tutional history of in personam and quasi in rem jurisdiction. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. In Personam Jurisdiction 
The traditional test for the exercise of extraterritorial, in per­
sonam jurisdiction 10 over a nonresident has been minimum contacts, 
as promulgated by the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington .11 In International Shoe, a Delaware corporation with a 
principal place of business in Missouri had several salesmen within 
the state of Washington, but neither maintained an office nor en­
gaged in intrastate deliveries of goods in Washington. The salesmen 
were Washington residents. The principal sales activities, selling 
shoes from a company providing a line of samples, took place in 
Washington. 12 The state brought an action to compel the corpora­
tion to contribute to the state unemployment tax fund, against which 
the Washington salesmen could draw should their employment cease 
with the International Shoe Corporation. 13 The Court held that the 
corporation's intrastate activities were continuous and systematic 
and demonstrated sufficient contact with the state to grant the Wash­
ington court jurisdiction over defendant. Assertion of jurisdiction 
under such circumstances would be commensurate with the four­
teenth amendment standards of due process. 14 In dicta the Court 
noted that, in this area, due process means compliance with the 
traditional notions of "fair play and substantial justice."ls Satisfac­
tion of these notions depends on the quality and nature of the non­
10. In personam jurisdiction is the power of a court to compel the parties in an 
action to appear and to submit to the court's orders and decisions based upon the parties' 
actions within the court's geographical boundaries. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724 
(1877). 
II. 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945). Prior to International Shoe, the basis for the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction had been the state's power over persons within its territory as set 
forth in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1877). International Shoe expanded the 
territorial power doctrine. 326 U.S. at 316. 
12. 326 U.S. at 313-14. 
13. Id. at 311. 
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residents' intrastate activities in light of the fair and orderly 
administration of the laws of the forum state. 16 A defendant who 
exercises the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state 
is not suffering any undue hardship when he is required to respond 
to lawsuits that arise from those activities.17 International Shoe set 
the stage for a series of cases that measured the intrastate activities of 
defendants against the constitutional mandates of the fourteenth 
amendment due process clause. 
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 18 represents the high 
water mark in the expansion of personal jurisdiction over nonresi­
dents. McGee was an action brought in a Texas state court by the 
beneficiary of a life insurance policy to enforce a California court 
judgment against the Texas company on the policy. 19 The Supreme 
Court held that delivery of an insurance contract in California, mail­
ing of premiums from California, and the insured's California resi­
dency were sufficient contacts with California to require the Texas 
insurance company to defend a California lawsuit on the policy.20 
McGee represents the lowest level of contacts acceptable to confer in 
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident. Later in the same term 
the Court clarified its concept of minimum contacts in Hanson v. 
Denckla.21 In Hanson, two competing groups of heirs sought to es­
tablish a right to a portion of the corpus of a trust settled in Dela­
ware by a former Delaware resident who moved to Florida. The 
parties each had obtained judgments, one in Florida and one in 
Delaware, supporting their respective positions.22 The Court held 
the Florida judgment invalid for want of personal jurisdiction over 
the Delaware trustee, a Delaware bank.23 The Court supported this 
holding by noting that restrictions on jurisdiction are more than a 
guarantee of immunity from distant or inconvenient litigation; they 
are the consequence of territorial limitation on the jurisdictional 
16. Id. at 319. 
17. Id. The Court clarified these principles in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining 
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). Perkins permitted the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a 
foreign corporation, even though the cause of action did not arise in the forum state and 
did not relate to the corporate activities there. The fact that the corporation engaged in 
systematic and continuous activity within the state was sufficient grounds for the Court to 
hold that requiring the defendant to defend an action in the state was not violative of due 
process. Id. at 448. 
18. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
19. Id. at 221. 
20. Id. at 223. 
21. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
22. Id. at 238. 
23. Id. at 251, 254-55. 
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power of the several states.24 The retreat from the McGee high water 
mark came in the Hanson Court's statement that, however minimal 
the defendant's burden may be to defend in a foreign forum, the 
defendant cannot be compelled to do so unless he has had minimum 
contacts with the state so as to validate the exercise of jurisdiction 
over him.25 The Court noted that the nature of those minimum con­
tacts would be determined case-by-case, but they generally are de­
fined as "act[s] by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of 
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus in­
voking the benefits and protections of its laws."26 The Court rein­
forced its retreat from McGee by stating that "the flexible standard 
of International Shoe does not herald the eventual demise of all re­
strictions on personal jurisdiction in the state courtS."27 The Court 
reconciled its holding with McGee on two grounds. First, the cause 
of action in Hanson did not arise from an act or transaction in Flor­
ida.28 Second, in McGee, California had enacted special legislation 
to exercise its "manifest interest" in providing redress for state citi­
zens injured by nonresidents engaging in activity that the state 
deemed exceptional.29 Despite the admonition in Hanson, state 
courts and legislatures continued the trend of expanding state court 
jurisdiction.30 
In World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 31 the Supreme 
Court slowed that trend. World- Wide Volkswagen was an automo­
bile products liability action brought in an Oklahoma state court. 
Plaintiff, a New York resident at the time of purchase, bought an 
automobile in New York and subsequently was involved in an acci­
dent in Oklahoma while traveling to a new residence in Arizona.32 
Plaintiff brought suit against four defendants: The manufacturer; 
the importer; the New York based regional distributor; and the New 
York retail dealer.33 Despite the paucity of contacts with 
Oklahoma,34 the Oklahoma court sustained jurisdiction over all de­
24. Id. at 251. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 253. 
27. Id.at251. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 252. 
30. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 
432,442-44, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766-67 (1961). 
31. 444 U.S. 286(1980). 
32. Id. at 288. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 289. The only contact with Oklahoma was the fortuitous fact that the 
accident occurred there. 
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fendants on the ground that use of the automobile in Oklahoma was 
foreseeable within defendants' contemplation at sale.35 The manu­
facturer and the importer did not pursue the jurisdictional issue and 
remained as defendants.36 The retailer and the regional distributor 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Court held that 
foreseeability of tortious injury resulting from a product's use within 
a state, without any other contacts with the state by the defendant, is 
an insufficient ground for the assertion of jurisdiction over the de­
fendant manufacturer.37 The Court supported its holding by citing 
the principle that the relation between corporate defendants and the 
forum state must be such that it is reasonable to require corporations 
to defend where the suit is brought.38 Such a requirement is reason­
able when the defendants have purposefully availed themselves of 
the forum's benefits and protections.39 The requirement becomes 
unreasonable when based solely on the possibility that the defend­
ants' acts may have an impact on the forum.40 The defendants must 
have anticipated that their acts would have an effect on the forum.41 
Even a plaintiffs unilateral act of bringing goods into a state com­
bined with the defendants' ability to reasonably foresee that the 
plaintiff would do so are insufficient grounds for assertion of juris­
diction over the defendants.42 
In summary, the constitutional trend in state court personal ju­
risdiction is one of vast expansion beyond the territorial restrictions 
ofPennoyer v. Nejf.43 The courts, however, are slowing that trend in 
decisions like World- Wide Volkswagen. 44 
35. M. at 290-91. 
36. Id. at 288 n.3. 
37. M. at 298-99. 
38. M. at 292. 
39. M. at 295, 297. 
40. M. at 297-98. 
41. Id. at 297. 
42. M. at 298. 
43. 95 U.S. 714 (I877). See notes 10 & II supra. 
44. Various circuits of the federal court of appeals have applied World-Wide 
Volkswagen in a manner which continues to restrict a state's assertion ofjurisdiction over 
a nonresident defendant. See Bankhead Enterprises, Inc. v. Norfolk & w. Ry., 642 F.2d 
802,806 (5th Cir. 1981); Plant Food Co-op v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer, 633 F.2d 155, 
158 (9th Cir. 1980); Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 667 (1st Cir. 
1980), Cerl. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Standard Fittings Co. v. Sapag, S.A., 625 F.2d 
630,641-42 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 910 (1981); Neiman v. RudolfWoltf & 
Co., 619 F.2d 1189, 1193 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920 (1980); Poyner v. 
Erma Werke GMBH, 618 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 
(1980); Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 199 (5th Cir. 1980). But see Shanks v. 
Westland Equip. & Parts Co., 668 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1982). 
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B. Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction 
The constitutional history of quasi in rem jurisdiction45 evinces 
a similar trend that the Supreme Court has retarded in recent 
decisions. 
Pennoyer established the principle that the due process clause 
limits a state's jurisdiction, not only to persons,46 but also to property 
physically within its territory.47 This territorial limitation on quasi 
in rem jurisdiction began to erode in Harris v. Balk.48 
In Harris, one North Carolina resident, Harris, owed a debt to 
another North Carolina resident, Balk. Balk, in tum, owed a debt to 
a Maryland resident, Epstein. Harris paid Balk's debt to Epstein 
under a Maryland court judgment rendered in favor of Epstein 
against Harris while he was temporarily in Maryland. The Mary­
land court had established jurisdiction by attaching the debt and 
personally serving Harris in Maryland. Balk sued Harris on his 
debt, alleging that the satisfied Maryland judgment was not a bar to 
recovery.49 The Court noted that a debt follows the debtor50 and 
held that jurisdiction with regard to a nonresident debtor could be 
validly established by attachment of a debt owed to the nonresident 
debtor if the second debt, in the form of the person of the second 
debtor, was present within the forum state and the court established 
personal jurisdiction over the second debtor. 51 This concept of quasi 
in rem jurisdiction reached its zenith in a 1966 New York Court of 
Appeals case, Seider v. Roth .52 
In Seider, plaintiffs were New York residents involved in an au­
tomobile accident in Vermont with a Canadian citizen. Plaintiffs in­
itiated an action in the New York courts, establishing jurisdiction 
over defendant by attachment of defendant's insurance policy as a 
debt owed to the insured by the insurer and by personally serving 
45. Proceedings quasi in rem are of two kinds. The first kind, involving actions to 
recover possession of land, quiet title or foreclose a mortgage, is inapplicable to the pres­
ent jurisdictional discussion. In the second kind, the plaintiff does not assert an interest 
in the object but asserts a claim against the defendant personally and through attachment 
or garnishment seeks to apply the Object to satisfy the plaintiff's claim. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 56-68, at 191, Introductory Note (1971). Quasi in 
rem proceedings of the second kind allow the defendant's property to be used as both the 
basis for jurisdiction over the defendant and for satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim. 
46. See note 10 supra for a brief discussion of Pennoyer v. NtJ!. 
47. 95 U.S. at 723-24. 
48. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). 
49. Id. at 216-17. 
50. Id. at 222. 
51. Id. 
52. 17 N.Y.2d 111,216 N.E.2d 312,269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). 
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defendant in Quebec.53 The court held that quasi in rem jurisdiction 
was validly established through the attachment of the insurance pol­
icy, construing the policy as a debt owed to defendant by the in­
surer.54 Although the New York courts55 and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit56 subsequently validated the 
Seider doctrine, it has received a great deal of criticism from both 
courts57 and commentators.58 Two recent Supreme Court decisions 
have combined to invalidate Seider and thereby inhibit the expan­
sion of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 
In Shaffer v. Heitner,59 decided in 1977, a Delaware court estab­
lished quasi in rem jurisdiction over a shareholders' derivative action 
by attaching shares of stock and stock options owned by defendant 
corporate directors.6o The Supreme Court expanded International 
53. Id. at 112,216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100-01. 
54. Id. at 114,216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102. 
55. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305,310,234 N.E.2d 669,671,287 N.Y.S.2d 
633,636-37 (1967), affd, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 320, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914, 
915-16 (1968) (per curiam). 
56. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 112-13 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 
844 (1969). 
57. In the eight years after denial of certiorari in Minichiello, a number of courts 
examined the Seider doctrine. All but two of these decisions rejected the doctrine. Tes­
sier v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 458 F.2d 1299, 1300 n.2 (1st Cir. 1972) (interpreting 
Massachusetts law); Kirchman v. Mikula, 443 F.2d 816, 817 (5th Cir. 1971); Sykes v. 
Beal, 392 F. Supp. 1089, 1096 (D. Conn. 1975); Ricker v. Lajoie, 314 F. Supp. 401, 403 
(D. Vt. 1970); Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 642, 552 P.2d 728, 738, 131 Cal. 
Rptr. 768, 778 (1976); Grinnell v. Garrett, 295 So. 2d 496, 499 (La. App.), cert. denied, 
300 So. 2d 181 (La. 1974); State ex rel Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 
942,949-50 (Mo. App. 1970); Hart v. Cote, 145 N.J. Super. 420, 426, 367 A.2d 1219, 1222 
(1976); Johnson v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Okla. 1972); 
DeRentiis v. Lewis, 106 R.I. 240,245-46,258 A.2d 464,467 (1969); Howard v. Allen, 254 
S.c. 455, 459-62, 176 S.E.2d 127, 128-30 (1970). The Seider doctrine was also unaccept­
able in federal maritime law. Robinson v. O. F. Shearer & Sons, 429 F.2d 83, 85-86 (3d 
Cir. 1970). The two courts which accepted Seider did so on a limited basis. Rintala v. 
Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1053 (D. Minn. 1973); Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, 
624,313 A.2d 129, 133 (1973). 
58. For a sampling of commentators' criticism of Seider, see Daynard, The Use of 
Social Policy in Judicial Decision-Making, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 919, 939-43 (1971); Mar­
tin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 187 n.11 
(\976); Reese, The Elpanding Scope ofJurisdiction Over Non-Residents-New York Goes 
Wild, 35 INS. COUNSEL J. 118, 119 (1968); Comment, Attachment oJ "Obligations"-A 
New Chapter in Long Arm Jurisdiction, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 769, 773-77 (1967); Com­
ment, Garnishment ofIntangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 
67 COLUM. L. REV. 550, 559-60 (1967); Note, Attachment ofLiability Insurance Policies, 
53 CORNELL L. REV. 1108, 1108 (1968); Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 
43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 58, 81 (1968); Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's 
Obligations, 19 STAN. L. REV. 654, 660 (1967). 
59. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
60. Id. at 189-94. 
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Shoe and held that state jurisdiction over a nonresident, whether ex­
erted in personam or quasi in rem, must be evaluated according to 
the International Shoe minimum contacts standards.61 The Court 
defined the nature of minimum contacts required for quasi in rem 
jurisdiction by stating that the use of property which is neither the 
subject matter of the litigation nor related to the underlying cause of 
action as the basis for the assertion of jurisdiction is insufficient to 
meet the due process standard.62 
Shaffer thus overruled both Harris 63 and Seider with regard to 
the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction.64 The Court also noted 
that as the issue was not raised in Shaffer, the question whether the 
presence of a defendant's property in the state is a sufficient basis for 
jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the plaintiff was not 
considered.65 In 1980, Rush v. Savchuk 66 invalidated the Seider doc­
trine67 and responded to the question unanswered by Shaffer. 
In Rush, plaintiff was a resident of Indiana at the time of his 
involvement, as a passenger, in an Indiana automobile accident. 
The Indiana guest statute barred plaintiff from suing the driver of 
the automobile in which he was a passenger.68 Plaintiff subsequently 
moved to Minnesota with his parents and filed suit in the Minnesota 
61. /d. at 212. 
62. Id. at 213. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
predated this portion of Shqffer by six years in Rivera v. Pocahontas S.S. Co., 340 F. 
Supp. 1307, 1310 (D. Mass. 1971) (defendant's interest in real property in Massachusetts 
does not confer, in and of itself, jurisdiction on the court when there is no demonstration 
that defendant's property interest is related to plaintiffs cause of action). 
63. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 199 (2d Cir.), cerro denied, 
439 U.S. 1034 (1978) (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 208-09). The property in Harris, the 
debt between the two North Carolina residents, was unrelated to the debt sued on be­
tween the North Carolina creditor and the Maryland creditor. 433 U.S. at 209. See 
notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Harris. 
64. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 197 n.2. (2d Cir.), cerr. de­
nied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978). The O'Connor court, however, upheld the Seider doctrine on 
the basis of its operation as a judicially created direct action against the insurer. Id. at 
201-02. 
65. 433 U.S. at 211 n.37. 
66. 444 U.S. 320 (1980). 
67. After the Supreme Court's decision in Shqffer, the New York Court of Appeals 
upheld Seider in an automobile tort case on grounds of stare decisis. Baden V. Staples, 45 
N.Y.2d 889, 892-93, 383 N.E.2d 110, ·112, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (1978). After Rush. 
however, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated Seider. Erneta V. Princeton Hosp., 
49 N.Y.2d 829, 830, 404 N.E.2d 1335, 1335,427 N.Y.S.2d 794, 794 (1980) (mem.). The 
concurrence in Erneta characterized the decision as "an obligatory abandonment of the 
Seider doctrine upon constraint of Rush V. Savchuk . ..." Id. at 830, 404 N.E.2d at 
1335, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 794 (Jasen, J., concurring) .. 
68. 444 U.S. at 322 (citing IND. CODE § 9-3-3-1 (1976». 
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state court.69 The Minnesota court obtained quasi in rem jurisdic­
tion by garnishment of defendant's insurance obligation to defend 
and indemnify him in conjunction with such an action.70 The 
Supreme Court held that a state violates due process by the exercise 
of quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant, who has no forum con­
tacts, through attachment of the obligation of the insurer. Although 
the insurer may be licensed to do business in the state to defend and 
indemnify the defendant, the plaintiff has no direct right of action 
against the insurer.71 
The Supreme Court explained the due process requirements as­
sociated with quasi in rem jurisdiction. If the defendant has certain 
judicially cognizable ties with the forum state which are related to 
the present cause of action, those ties may be relevant to determine 
compliance with due process standards of fair play and substantial 
justice.72 While the parties' relations may be significant in evaluat­
ing the defendant's contacts with the forum, the touchstone for asser­
tion of jurisdiction is due process in light of the defendant's 
contacts.73 The Court further stated that a plaintiff's contacts with 
the forum are not decisive in determining whether a defendant's due 
process rights are violated by exercise of jurisdiction over him.74 In 
making this statement, the Court answered the Sha.ffer question:75 
The lack of an available forum to a plaintiff is not decisive in ob­
taining jurisdiction over a defendant.76 
In summary, the Constitution requires that the assertion of ju­
risdiction over a nonresident defendant must meet the due process 
standards of fair play and substantial justice. Due process, therefore, 
is the touchstone and overrides other considerations such as the 
plaintiff's relation to the forum, the relation between the defendant 
and the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's inability to avail himself of an­
other forum. With this constitutional standard in mind, the discus­
69. There is no indication in either the state court or the Supreme Court opinions 
of forum shopping by the plaintiff or that the move to Minnesota was anything other 
than one accomplished in the normal course of events. See Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 
480,245 N.W.2d 624 (1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), on remand, 311 Minn. 496, 272 
N.W.2d 888 (1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). 
70. 444 U.S. at 323-24. 
71. Id. at '328-32. 
72. Id. at 332-33. 
73. Id. at 331-32. 
74. Id. at 332-33. 
75. See note 65 supra and accompanying text. 
76. 444 U.S. at 332-33. 
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sion now proceeds to analysis of the case law interpreting the Long 
Arm Statute. 
III. ANALYSIS 
This discussion will focus on the judicial interpretations of sec­
tions 2 and 3 of chapter 223A, the heart of the Long Arm Statute. 
Section 2 allows jurisdiction over a person, natural or corporate, 
based on continuing contact, such as maintaining a domicile or prin­
cipal place of business in the Commonwealth or organization under 
its laws.77 Under section 3 there are six specific kinds of activity 
which, in the context of business litigation,78 may subject a nonresi­
dent defendant to the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth's courts. 
Each kind will be covered separately below. Throughout this discus­
sion, the reader should keep in mind that, even though a nonresident 
defendant's activities literally may come within one of the section 2 
or section 3 provisions, the assertion ofjurisdiction over the nonresi­
dent still must pass constitutional muster.79 
A. Section 2: Continuing Contact with the Commonwealth 
Section 2 states: "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction 
over a person domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or main­
taining his or its principal place of business in, this commonwealth 
as to any cause of action."80 The statutory language appears to be 
straightforward and not in need of judicial construction. Neverthe­
less, one interesting case, involving jurisdiction over a nonresident 
executor in a contract action against an estate, has arisen. In 
Saporito v. Litner,81 the supreme judicial court noted that testator 
resided, practiced medicine, and performed portions of the disputed 
contract in the Commonwealth during his lifetime. 82 The court 
found that these facts would have evinced sufficient continuing con­
tacts for jurisdiction over testator had he lived to defend the action. 
Jurisdiction was then imputable to testator's executor, regardless of 
77. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223A § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974). 
78. Id. § 3. Subsection 3(g), added in 1976, deals with nonresidency in a divorce 
context, 1976 Mass. Acts 435, and is inapplicable to this discussion. This subsection is a 
codification of the holding in Wood v. Wood, 369 Mass. 665, 671-72,342 N.E.2d 712, 
716-17 (1976). See generally Kennedy v. Kennedy. [1980] Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1211, 
406 N.E.2d 409. 
79. See notes 18-75 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of constitutional 
aspects of jurisdiction. 
80. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223A. § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976). 
81. 371 Mass. 607, 358 N.E.2d 809 (1976). 
82. fd. 
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executor's non-residency or his appointment by a foreign court.83 
B. 	 Characteristics ofBusiness Activity That Will Comply With Due 
Process Requirements in Application ofSection J 
The preamble of section 3 states that the courts may exercise 
jurisdiction over a person who acts directly, or by an agent, as to a 
cause of action at law or in equity arising from the acts enumerated 
in the subsections.84 The supreme judicial court and the First Cir­
cuit, in a series of decisions over the past nine years, have indicated 
the characteristics such acts must manifest in order to pass constitu­
tional muster.85 Analysis of those decisions reveals two required 
characteristics: Active, as opposed to passive, involvement,86 and 
systematic and continuous, rather than isolated, activity.87 
In Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft COrp.,88 a California cor­
poration with offices in Massachusetts brought breach of contract 
and deceit actions against three foreign corporations.89 One corpo­
ration had engaged in direct transactions with plaintiff,90 while the 
other two corporations placed orders for metal alloy logs with plain­
tiff only after the first corporation indicated that plaintiff's products 
were approved for use in aircraft construction.91 The First Circuit 
upheld jurisdiction over the first corporation92 but denied jurisdic­
tion over the other two corporations.93 In support of its holding, the 
court stated that nonresident defendants who have direct contacts 
with a resident plaintiff will have the constitutionality of the exertion 
of jurisdiction evaluated under a five-part test: "[T]he nature and 
purpose of the contacts[;] the connection between the contacts and 
the cause of action[;] the number of contacts[;] the interest of the 
forum[;] and the convenience and fairness to the parties. . . ."94 
Nonresident defendants who are passive purchasers, lacking any di­
rect contact with the plaintiff, will not be subject to jurisidiction on 
two grounds. First, allowing the mere isolated entry into a manufac­
83. 	 Id. at 618, 358 N.E.2d at 815-16. 
84. 	 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976). 
85. 	 See notes 88-116 infra and accompanying text. 
86. 	 See notes 88-95 infra and accompanying text. 
87. 	 See notes 96-117 infra and accompanying text. 
88. 	 482 F.2d 1079 (1st Cir. 1973). 
89. 	 Id. at 1080-81. 
90. 	 Id. at 1081. 
91. 	 Id. at 1084-85. 
92. 	 Id. at 1082-84. 
93. 	 Id. at 1084-85. 
94. 	 Id. at 1083. 
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turing agreement with a forum resident to support jurisdiction ren­
ders all nonresident purchasers subject to long arm jurisdiction. 
Second, such a broad exertion of long arm jurisdiction will discour­
age foreign purchasers from dealing with resident sellers by generat­
ing a fear that the foreign purchaser will have to defend actions in 
distant courtS.95 
The second characteristic is continuous and systematic, rather 
than isolated, activity. Four decisions of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court described the nature of this characteristic. In "Auto­
matic" Sprinkler ,96 the court refused to allow assertion of jurisdic­
tion over nonresident defendant whose contacts, in a breach of 
contract action for unpaid balance due on the sale of a palletizing 
machine,97 were the mailing of a signed purchase order, the receipt 
of an invoice, and the mailing of a partial payment.98 The court 
defined isolated activity as activity that has a slight impact on Mas­
sachusetts commerce and through which the defendant does "not 
'purposefully ... [avail] itself of the privilege of conducting activi­
ties within the forum state.' "99 In 1978, the court reiterated the "Au­
tomatic" Sprinkler concept of isolated activity in Droukas v. Divers 
Training Academy, Inc. ,100 a breach of warranty action filed by a 
Massachusetts purchaser of two allegedly defective marine engines 
purchased from a Florida corporation. 101 The court refused to allow 
the assertion of jurisdiction over defendants,102 noting that a single 
sale "f.o.b."103 was an isolated transaction devoid of any other signif­
icant contacts with the Commonwealth. I04 As such, it was not an act 
by which defendant" 'purposefully [availed] itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the bene­
fits and protections of its laws.' "105 In 1979 and 1980, the court fur­
ther described isolated activity and defined its opposite facet, 
95. Id. at 1084-85. 
96. 361 Mass. 441, 280 N.E.2d 423 (1972). 
97. Id. at 441, 280 N.E.2d at 424. 
98. Id. at 444, 280 N.E.2d at 425. 
99. Id. at 446, 280 N.E.2d at 426 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 
(1958» (brackets in original). 
100. 375 Mass. 149, 376 N.E.2d 548 (1978). 
101. Id. at 150, 376 N.E.2d at 549. 
102. Id. at 157-60, 376 N.E.2d at 553-54. 
103. In a contract for the sale of goods, the term "f.o.b." refers to terms of delivery 
and passage of the risk of loss to the goods. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-319(1) 
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1976). 
104. 375 Mass. at 158-59, 376 N.E.2d at 553-54. 
105. Id. at 159,376 N.E.2d at 554 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,253 
(1958» (brackets in original). 
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systematic and continuous activity. Good Hope Industries involved a 
civil action by a Massachusetts corporation and its wholly owned 
subsidiaries, which maintained offices in Massachusetts, against a 
Texas corporation. 106 The court upheld jurisdiction over defend­
ant. 107 In doing so, the court refined the definition of isolated activ­
ity to include transactions that have no commercial consequences in 
Massachusetts.108 Conversely, the court defined systematic and con­
tinuous activity as activity of substantial dimension and duration, 
which involves close contact with a forum resident. 109 The court 
pointed out that when a defendant has engaged in such substantial 
activity, he will not come into the Commonwealth's courts as an un­
suspecting defendant. I 10 Carlson Corp. v. University of Vermont III 
involved a Massachusetts corporation'S suit against nonresident de­
fendant for the balance due on a construction contract. 112 The 
supreme judicial court upheld the trial court's determination that it 
had jurisdiction 113 and described systematic and continuous activity 
as activity that has substantial commercial consequences within the 
Commonwealth. 114 Failure to honor a contractual obligation in­
volving a large sum of money, in this case, payment for costs of the 
construction of a college living and learning center, will have sub­
stantial commercial consequences. I IS Note that the entire construc­
tion contract in Carlson was to be performed within the state of 
Vermont and thus, the only connection with the Commonwealth was 
that the parties executed the contract in Massachusetts. 116 
A nonresident defendant's activity thus must manifest two char­
acteristics to pass constitutional muster. First, it must be active, in­
volving direct transactions with the plaintiff. In addition, it must be 
continuous and systematic; that is, it must be of considerable dimen­
sion and duration, it must involve close contact with the plaintiff, 
and it must manifest the possibility of substantial commercial conse­
quences within the Commonwealth. Activity that constitutes merely 
an isolated transaction, has little or no significant impact upon com­
106. 378 Mass. I, 3, 389 N.E.2d 76, 78 (1979). 
107. ld. at 11-12, 389 N.E.2d at 82-83. 
108. ld. at 9, 389 N.E.2d at 81. 
109. ld. 
110. ld. at 10, 389 N.E.2d at 82. 

Ill. [1980] Mass. Adv. Sh. 659, 402 N.E.2d 483. 

112. /d. at 659, 402 N.E.2d at 483. 
113. ld. at 667, 402 N.E.2d at 487. 
114. ld. at 664, 402 N.E.2d at 486. 
115. ld. at 666, 402 N.E.2d at 487. 
116. ld. at 661, 402 N.E.2d at 484. 
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merce in the Commonwealth, and does not involve direct contact 
with a resident plaintiff will not pass constitutional muster for the 
assertion of jurisdiction. 
C. Section 3(a): Transacting Business in the Commonwealth 
The most widely litigated subsection is section 3(a), the opera­
tive words of which are very general: "transacting any business in 
this commonwealth."lI7 The judicial standard as to what level of 
activity satisfies the transacting business requirement is somewhat 
amorphous. In cases of clearly isolated and infrequent business con­
tact, the courts have held that the nonresident defendant's activities 
did not meet the literal requirements of the statute. IIS Activity, how­
ever, that is active, continuous, and systematic, and has an obvious 
impact on commerce in the Commonwealth clearly qualifies as 
transacting business. I 19 On the other hand, even this increased level 
117. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3(a) (Michie/Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1981). 
118. Kahn Paper Co. v. Crosby, 476 F. Supp. 1011, 1012-14 (D. Mass. 1979) (non­
resident guarantor of payment for goods sold to another nonresident, when guarantor 
neither leased nor owned real or personal property in Massachusetts and did not execute 
the guarantee in Massachusetts); McClellan v. Woonsocket Inst. for Sav., 466 F. Supp. 
943,944 (D. Mass. 1979) (a nonresident bank which neither maintains offices, personnel 
or a mailing address, nor conducts loan closings in Massachusetts); Levine v. MacNeil, 
428 F. Supp. 675, 676 (D. Mass. 1977) (single purchase of an automobile within the 
Commonwealth); Walsh v. National Seating Co., 411 F. Supp. 564, 569 (D. Mass. 1976) 
(bus seat manufacturer who mailed repair parts to parties to the action in Massachusetts 
but who maintained no sales office, inventory, nor a business license within the Com­
monwealth); Nichols Assoc. v. Starr, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 91, 94-97, 341 N.E.2d 909,911-13 
(1976) (nonresident surveyor's work for Massachusetts plaintiff and delivery of plans for 
an out-of-state project to Massachusetts plaintiff at plaintiffs Massachusetts offices at 
plaintiffs request). 
119. Good Hope Indus., Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 378 Mass. at 9-10, 389 N.E.2d at 
81; Droukas v. Divers Training Academy, Inc., 375 Mass. at 153, 376 N.E.2d at 551; 
"Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. of America v. Seneca Foods Corp., 361 Mass. at 446, 280 
N.E.2d at 426. See Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079, 1082-84 
(1st Cir. 1973) (active supervision of and participation in development of prototype prod­
uct, extensive contact with in-state parties, subsequent monitoring of the performance of 
the Massachusetts manufacture of the final product); Marketing & Distrib. Resources v. 
Paccar, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 990, 993-95 (D. Mass. 1978) (entry into contracts with two 
Massachusetts corporations for production of sales trainers, contemplation that the con­
tracts would be performed in Massachusetts, numerous telephone calls and voluminous 
correspondence with Massachusetts corporations relating to the contracts); Salter v. 
Lawn, 294 F. Supp. 882, 884 (D. Mass. 1969) (organization, use, and control of a bank­
rupt Massachusetts corporation for the sole purpose of facilitating an agreement whereby 
nonresident was to share in ultimate corporate profits); C.H. Babb Co. v. A.M. Mfg. Co., 
14 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 292-93 (1982) (non-resident corporation pursuit of acquisition of 
business through Massachusetts independent retailer, transmission by mail and tele­
phone of potential customer lists to the retailer with instruction to use best efforts to 
conclude sales); Campbell v. Frontier Fishing & Hunting Ltd., (1980) Mass. App. Ct. 
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of activity may be insufficient to invoke registration under the Mas­
sachusetts Foreign Corporations Statute. 120 
When the case involves business activities that are classified as 
either clearly transacting business or not, the constitutional issues be­
come subordinate to the literal statutory evaluation of those activi­
ties for the invocation of jurisdiction under section 3(a). When the 
activities are such that a clear, literal determination becomes impos­
sible, the constitutional issues become the touchstone for determina­
tion of jurisdiction. An excellent illustration of this principle is a 
comparison of Guay v. Ozark Airlines, Inc. 121 and Sahatjian v. Wood­
lets, Inc. 122 
In both cases, Massachusetts residents brought breach of em­
ployment contract actions against their nonresident corporate em­
ployers. 123 In Sahatjian, defendant solicited sales in the 
Commonwealth through plaintiff, a resident agent. The court held 
that the voluntary nature of this action satisfied constitutional re­
quirements, thus invoking fair play and substantial justice to require 
defendant to defend the action in Massachusetts. 124 In Guay, de-
Adv. Sh. 1145, 1146-47,405 N.E.2d 989, 990-91 (nonresident corporation maintenance of 
an agent, receipt of cash deposits for trips, and derivation of 33% of its business in 
Massachusetts). 
120. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 181, § 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1977). The statute allows 
a foreign corporation to maintain bank accounts; maintain and appoint trustees to hold, 
transfer, exchange, or register its securities; hold meetings of directors and shareholders; 
participate in action, suit, or administrative or arbitration proceedings; and comply with 
Massachusetts banking or insurance laws and not be subject to the filing requirement. In 
Goodwin Bros. Leasing v. Nousis, 373 Mass. 169, 366 N.E.2d 38 (1977), the court stated 
that machines owned and leased within the Commonwealth, the basis for the attempt to 
enforce the foreign corporation registration requirement, were "mere incidents of [the 
corporation's] interstate business." Id. at 176,366 N.E.2d at 43. The legislature recently 
codified this portion of Goodwin. See 1981 Mass. Legis. Servo 455 (West). The "incidents 
of interstate business" concept is one strongly rooted in prior Massachusetts case law. 
See Shulton, Inc. V. Consumer Value Stores, Inc., 352 Mass. 605, 611, 227 N.E.2d 482, 
485 (1967). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, almost 20 years before Goodwin 
and 15 years before the enactment of the present language of Chapter 181, Section 3, 
explicitly defined the concept to include the following activities: maintaining an office, 
using a local bank account, employing local stenographers, presence of resident salesper­
sons, presence of sample inventory and execution and performance of fair trade contracts 
with resident product dealers and distributors. Remington Arms CO. V. Lechmere Tire & 
Sales Co., 339 Mass. 131, 137, 158 N.E.2d 134, 138-39 (1959). These activities and those 
in Goodwin clearly would be sufficient to invoke jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. 
See note 70 supra, specifically Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircrqfi Corp. and subsequent 
cases; notes 86-115 supra and accompanying text. 
121. 450 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1978). 
122. 466 F. Supp. 945 (D. Mass. 1979). 
123. Id. at 946-47; 450 F. Supp. at 1107-08. 
124. 466 F. Supp. at 949. 
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fendant operated charter flights in and out of the Commonwealth, 
was responsive to requests for tickets from independent travel 
agents, maintained a settlement bank account for the facilitation of 
travel agent ticket sales for connecting flights on other airlines, and 
maintained a "WATS" telephone .number for the receipt of ticket 
orders. 125 The court held that these activities were of insufficient di­
mension to meet constitutional standards and did not require de­
fendant to defend the lawsuit in Massachusetts. 126 The activities of 
both defendants so parallel each other that it is impossible to distin­
guish the cases on their facts. Constitutionally, however, the distinc­
tion is clear. Defendant in Sahatjian clearly solicated business in the 
Commonwealth and, in doing so, "avail[ed] itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the bene­
fits and protections of its laws."127 In Guay, defendant's activities as 
to the ticket sales,128 the bank account,129 and the "WATS" line 130 
were only to facilitate its services to independent travel agents. The 
charter flights averaged about six per year, were generally in support 
of professional sports teams flying in and out of Boston to a single, 
distant city, and were accomplished under contracts made outside of 
Massachusetts. 131 These activities clearly were isolated events, 
rather than systematic and continuous business activities in pursuit 
of trade within the Commonwealth.132 Thus, they failed the consti­
tutional test of fair play and substantial justice required to force de­
fendant to defend in Massachusetts. 133 
125. 450 F. Supp. at 1108-10. 
126. Id. at 1111. 
127. 466 F. Supp. at 947-48 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958». 
128. 450 F. Supp. at 1110. 
129. Id. at 1109-10. 
130. Id. at 1110. 
131. /d. at 1108-09. 
132. Id. at 1112. 
133. In each of the following cases, the court granted jurisdiction over the nonresi­
dent defendant using the constitutional standards as the touchstone. In other words, de­
fining the defendant's activities as transacting business did not offend constitutional 
standards. Nova Biomedical Corp. v. Moller, 629 F.2d 190, 197 (1st Cir. 1980) (nonresi­
dent's mailing a letter from out of state to an in-state plaintiff alleging patent infringe­
ment and threatening litigation); Little, Brown & Co. v. Bourne, 493 F. Supp. 544, 546-47 
(D. Mass. 1980) (activities of nonresident author to facilitate the editing and publishing 
of a book); North Am. Video v. Leon, 480 F. Supp. 213, 218-19 (D. Mass. 1979) (resident 
corporation's telephone calls to nonresident defendant's employees and defendant's at­
tendance at business meetings within the Commonwealth); Boston Super Tools, Inc. v. 
RW Technologies, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 558, 561-62 (D. Mass. 1979) (nonresident defend­
ant's sale of tools through a local distributor, dealership agreement with local distributors 
and frequent communication with local distributor); Carlson Corp. v. University of Ver­
mont, [1980] Mass. Adv. Sh. 659, 662, 402 N.E.2d 483, 485 (execution of a contract within 
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There may be cases in which the facts are such that meeting the 
literal requirements of section 3(a) may be questionable, but the 
plaintiffs counsel believes that invocation ofjurisdiction over the de­
fendant would not offend constitutional standards. The solution to 
this problem is the pleading of additional and alternative statutory 
grounds for jurisdiction. 134 
D. 	 Section 3(b): Contracting to Supply Services or Things within 
the Commonwealth 
The judicial construction of "contracting to supply services or 
things" is clear but still is subject to constitutional scrutiny. The per­
formance of a contract to provide goods or services within the Com­
monwealth, regardless of where it was made, must be the 
precipitating factor for the plaintiffs cause of action. 135 This inter­
pretation extends to include a contract between a nonresident ship­
per and a nonresident railroad corporation to transport produce 
from Florida to Boston.136 Use of the constitutional due process 
standard, however, has prevented an overly broad interpretation of 
the statutory language by rejecting jurisdiction over a nonresident 
connecting railroad carrier in the delivery of perishable food to Mas­
sachusetts 137 and a Florida corporation that made an isolated sale of 
two marine engines to a Massachusetts businessman. 138 This clear 
judicial interpretation continues in the area of tortious injury. 
E. 	 Section 3(c): Causing Tortious Injury by Act or Omission . 
in the Commonwealth 
The statutory language of section 3(c) is plain on its face, thus 
the cases under this section draw their operative limits without overt 
the Commonwealth); First Nat'l Bank v. Bergreen, (1981) Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 524, 
524-25,417 N.E.2d 50, 50-51 (rescript) (nonresident defendant's execution in Massachu­
setts of written guarantees of Massachusetts corporation). 
134. See Good Hope Indus., Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 378 Mass. at 6-7, 389 N.E.2d 
at 79-80. See generally McClellan v. Woonsocket Inst. for Sav., 466 F. Supp. 943, 944-45 
(D. Mass. 1979) (neither nonresident defendant's activities nor ownership of property 
meets statutory or constitutional requirements); Backman v. Schiff, 84 F.R.D. 132, 136-37 
(D. Mass. 1979) (nonresident defendant's activities do not meet the statutory transacting 
business requirements but do statutorily qualify as acts or injuries within the Common­
wealth which cause tortious injury). 
135. 	 Singer v. Paggio, 420 F.2d 679, 681 (1st Cir. 1970). 
136. 	 Sarno v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 327 F. Supp. 506, 507 (D. Mass. 1971). 
137. Community-Suffolk, Inc. v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R., 475 F. Supp. 443, 
446 (D. Mass. 1979). 
138. Droukas v. Divers Training Academy, Inc., 375 Mass. 149, 157-59, 376 
N.E.2d 548, 553-54 (1978). 
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reference to constitutional standards. 139 The act or omission of the 
defendant can be a purely physical one,140 or one that is not purely 
physical but still tortious. 141 The act or omission, however, must oc­
cur within the Commonwealth. 142 Acts or omissions outside the 
Commonwealth fall under section 3(d). 
F. 	 Section J(d): Tortious Injury from an Act or Omission Outside 
the Commonwealth 
Section 3(d) allows jurisdiction where a nonresident defendant 
"caus[ed] tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or omission 
outside this commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, 
or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives sub­
stantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, 
in this commonwealth."143 The courts have taken the "tortious in­
jury" language at face value l44 and have concentrated on the "doing 
business" aspect of the section. In the "doing business" analysis the 
constitutional standard again comes into play. Regularly doing 
business, or "persistent course of conduct," is defined as regular so­
licitation or the derivation of substantial revenue. 145 Once the two 
statutory requirements are met, the court must find that invocation 
139. The definition of a tort is "a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for 
which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages." W. PROS­
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § I at 2 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser seems to indicate 
that once tortious injury has occurred, the tortfeasor can be constitutionally required to 
defend an action on the tort at its situs. Id. But see Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. 
Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902-03 (2d Cir. 1981), for discusison of the fiduciary shield doctrine 
which exempts corporate agents from long arm jurisdiction in individual actions arising 
from tortious acts committed solely for employer benefit. 
140. Backman v. Schiff, 84 F.R.D. 132, 137 (D. Mass. 1971) (product marketing 
within the Commonwealth which allegedly involved misappropriation of proprietary in­
terest, breach of confidential relations, and interference with contractual relations). 
141. Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey, Inc., 460 F.2d 661,664 n.3 (1st Cir. 1972) (nonresi­
dent defendant knowingly distributes a false statement in Commonwealth intending that 
statement be relied upon to the injury of the resident plaintifi); Burtner v. Burnham, 13 
Mass. App. Ct. 158, 163 (1982) (nonresident defendant communicates by mailing and 
telephoning false information upon which plaintiff relies to his detriment). 
142. Chlebda v. H. E. Fortna & Bro., 609 F.2d 1022, 1023 (1st Cir. 1979) (failure to 
warn of dangers inherent in product use not established to have occurred within the 
Commonwealth); Bradley v. Chelueitte,65 F.R.D. 57, 59-61 (D. Mass. 1974) (improper 
release of plaintiff from Puerto Rican hospital by Puerto Rican doctor). 
143. 	 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3(d) (Michie/Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1981). 
144. Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier, Ltd., 454 F.2d 527, 530 (1st Cir. 1972) 
(claim of impairment of business operations sufficient assertion of tortious injury within 
Commonwealth). 
145. Kolikofv. Samuelson, 488 F. Supp. 881, 884 (D. Mass. 1980). The determina­
tion of substantial revenue is an absolute figure rather than a ratio of the in-state revenue 
to the total revenue. Mark v. Obear & Sons, 313 F. Supp. 373, 375-76 (D. Mass. 1970). 
Substantial revenue can be as low as $5,000.00. Id. 
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of jurisdiction satisfies the due process standards of the "traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice."146 The constitutional 
standard also is important in section 3(e). 
G. 	 Section 3(e): Interest, Use, or Possession ofReal Property 
Although interest, use, and possession of real property are am­
ply defined elsewhere,147 one court has extended the concepts to in­
clude the retention of an architect to design and construct a building 
on a nonresident defendant's leased land in Massachusetts. 148 Con­
stitutionally, the courts have both anticipated 149 and followed 150 the 
Supreme Court standard of Shaffer 15 I in holding that the defend­
ant's interest in real property in Massachusetts must be related to the 
cause of action for it to be the basis of the invocation of 
jurisdiction. 152 
H. 	 Section 3(/}: Contracts to Insure 
Section 3(f) is plain on its face and has not been the subject of 
litigation to date. The authors, however, predict that litigation under 
this section will focus on the constitutional standards enunciated in 
Rush. 153 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Massachusetts Long Arm Statute is designed to provide a 
forum where citizens of the Commonwealth may pursue causes of 
action that arise as the result of a nonresident's activities. Use of the 
Long Arm Statute is a twofold process in which both the statutory 
requirements regarding the nature of activity and the constitutional 
due process standards must be satisfied. In light of this twofold pro­
cess, counsel who anticipate defending or pursuing business litiga­
tion need to remain current on both the Massachusetts courts' 
statutory interpretations and the United States Supreme Court's con­
stitutional requirements concerning long arm jurisdiction. 
146. Ko1ikofv. Samuelson, 488 F. Supp. 881, 884 (D. Mass. 1980) (quoting Inter­
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945». 
147. 	 See D. PARK and M. PARK, 28 and 28A MASSACHUSETIS PRACTICE (1981). 
148. 	 deLeo v. Childs, 304 F. Supp. 593,595 (D. Mass. 1969). 
149. 	 See notes 59-62 supra and accompanying text. 
150. McClellan v. Woonsocket Inst. for Sav., 466 F. Supp. 943, 945 (D. Mass. 
1979). 
151. See notes 59-65 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Shqffer v. 
Heitner. 
152. 	 See notes 150-151 supra. 
153. See notes 66-75 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Rush v. 
Savchuk. 
